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Abstract	  This	  paper	  suggests	   that	   inequality	  of	   landownership	   is	  a	  non-­‐financial	  hurdle	   for	  human	   capital	   accumulation.	   It	   is	   the	   first	   to	   present	   evidence	   that	   inequality	   of	  landownership	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	   level	  of	  public	  education	   in	  the	  Korean	  colonial	  period.	  Exploiting	  variations	   in	   inequality	   in	   land	  concentration	  across	  regions	   in	  Korea	  and	  accounting	   for	   unobserved	   heterogeneity	   across	   theses	   regions,	   using	   a	   fixed	   effect	  model,	  	  the	  analysis	  establishes	  a	  highly	  significant	  adverse	  effect	  of	   land	   inequality	  on	  education	   in	  Korea’s	  colonial	  period.	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1	  Introduction	  	  
	   Human	   capital	   accumulation	   plays	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   Unified	   Growth	   Theory,	   which	  explains	   the	   transition	   from	  Malthusian-­‐trapped	   growth	   to	  modern	   growth	  with	   consistent	  logic	   (Galor	   and	   Weil	   2000;	   Galor	   2011).	   The	   process	   of	   industrialization	   increases	   the	  demand	   for	  human	  capital,	  which	   in	   turn	   incentivizes	   individuals	   to	  obtain	  more	  education.	  This	   accumulated	   human	   capital	   further	   accelerates	   economic	   growth.	   Therefore,	  circumstances	   that	   promote	   or	   limit	   the	   accumulation	   of	   human	   capital	   are	   critical	   in	  explaining	   cross-­‐country	   differences	   in	   the	   growth	   path	   and	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   transition	   to	  modern	  growth.	  This	   paper	   confirms	   that	   inequality	   in	   landownership	   adversely	   effects	   the	  establishment	  of	  public	  primary	  education,	  which	  promotes	  human	  capital	  accumulation,	  as	  hypothesized	  by	  Galor	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Using	  evidence	  from	  Korea,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  a	  society	  with	  more	   equal	   landownership,	   institutions	   that	   promote	   human	   capital	   accumulation	   are	  established	  sooner,	  leading,	  on	  average,	  to	  more	  education.	  Galor	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  considered	  the	  economic	   interests	  of	   the	  established	  landed	  elite,	  the	   emerging	   industrial	   elite,	   and	   common	   workers	   during	   the	   industrialization	   process.	  Because	  of	  the	  complementarity	  between	  physical	  capital	  and	  technology,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  physical	   capital	   due	   to	   industrialization	   results	   in	   an	   increased	   demand	   for	   human	   capital.	  The	   emerging	   industrial	   elite,	   therefore,	   have	   a	   friendly	   attitude	   toward	   public	   education,	  which	   can	   boost	   human	   capital	   accumulation.	   The	   landed	   elite,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   initially	  have	   a	   negative	   attitude	   toward	   the	   education	   policy	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   there	   is	   little	  complementarity	   between	   land,	   which	   is	   the	   main	   input	   to	   agricultural	   production	   and	  education,	   and	   second,	   education	   tends	   to	   separate	   labor	   from	   land,	   resulting	   in	   a	   lower	  return	  to	  land.	  	  The	   accumulation	   of	   human	   capital	   requires	   individuals	   to	   make	   investments	   in	  education,	   but	   because	   of	   capital	   market	   imperfections,	   these	   investments	   are	   suboptimal	  (Galor	   and	   Zeira	   1993).	   Public	   investment	   in	   education,	   therefore,	   lessens	   the	   financial	  burden	   of	   accumulating	   human	   capital	   and	   reinforces	   economic	   growth.	   The	   landed	   elite	  initially	  impede	  the	  implementation	  of	  policies	  promoting	  human	  capital,	  as	  described	  above.	  However,	  as	  the	  economy	  gradually	  shifts	  from	  agriculture	  to	  industry,	  landowners	  hold	  more	  physical	   capital	   and	   thus	   change	   their	   positions	   on	   public	   education.	   A	   society	   with	   more	  equally	   distributed	   landownership	   or	   scarce	   land,	   therefore,	   can	   implement	   the	   optimal	  education	  policy	  earlier.	  Moreover,	  this	  earlier	  implementation	  of	  public	  education	  promotes	  investments	  in	  human	  capital	  and	  thus	  accelerates	  economic	  growth.	  
The	  aim	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  show	  evidence	  of	   the	  adverse	  effect	  of	   land	   inequality	  on	  human	   capital	   accumulation	   using	   Korean	   data.	   My	   results	   are	   consistent	   with	   Galor	   et	   al.	  (2009)	  and	  Cinnirella	  and	  Hornung	  (2011),	  who	  used	  data	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Prussia,	  respectively.	  My	  empirical	   analysis	  uses	  a	  panel	  data	   set	   from	   the	  Annual	  Statistical	  Report	  of	  the	  
Government-­‐General	   (i.e.,	   the	   previous	   colonial	   government)	   to	   show	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  adverse	   effect	   of	   land	   ownership	   on	   education.	   This	   panel	   data	   allows	   me	   to	   control	   for	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  across	  regions.	  Through	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model,	  I	  find	  an	  exogenous	  effect	  of	   inequality	   in	   landownership	  on	  education,	  by	  controlling	  for	  regional	  differences	   in	  the	   share	   of	   agriculture,	   the	   share	   of	   jobs	   requiring	   more	   human	   capital,	   the	   population	  growth	  rate,	  and	  the	  share	  of	  Japanese	  individuals.	  Moreover,	  the	  finding	  is	  robust	  even	  when	  I	  control	   for	   the	  supply	  side	  of	  education.	  This	  result	   implies	   that	   the	  adverse	  effect	  of	  non-­‐financial	  hurdles,	  such	  as	  land	  inequality	  on	  human	  capital	  accumulation,	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  many	  settings.	  	  Furthermore,	  Korea’s	  growth	  path	  provides	  an	  interesting	  story.	  After	  independence,	  the	   Korean	   government	   implemented	   land	   reform	   that	   removed	   tenancy	   and	   established	  equality	   of	   landownership	   in	   1950.	   The	   following	   educational	   reform	   boosted	   the	  accumulation	   of	   human	   capital,	   after	  which	  Korea	   achieved	   industrialization	   and	   broke	   the	  Malthusian	  trap.	  Korea	  who	  was	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  as	  of	  1950,	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  in	  1996	  and	   achieved	   a	   gross	   domestic	   product	   (GDP)	   per	   capita	   of	   $22,424	   in	   2011	   (current	  US$)	  (World	  Bank	  2012).	  Both	   the	   timing	  and	   the	   consequences	  of	   land	   reform	  are	   important	   in	  understanding	  the	  fascinating	  story	  of	  Korean	  development.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	   this	  paper	  proceeds	  as	   follows.	   In	  section	  2,	   I	  present	   the	  related	  literature.	  Section	  3	  presents	  	  a	  simple	  theoretical	  model	  based	  on	  Galor	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Section	  4	   provides	   a	   historical	   background	   of	   Korea,	   focusing	   on	   the	   distinctive	   Korean	   colonial	  experience	   in	   terms	   of	   land	   inequality	   and	   education.	   Section	   5	   presents	   empirical	   results	  using	  the	  Korean	  data.	  Finally,	  section	  6	  gives	  concluding	  remarks.	  
 
2	  Theoretical	  background	  and	  related	  literature	  
	   The	   literature	   presents	   several	   different	   arguments	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	  inequality	  and	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  growth.	  Galor	  and	  Zeira	  (1993)	  constructed	  a	  macroeconomic	  model	  showing	  that	  inequality,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  credit	  constraints,	   has	   an	   adverse	   effect	   of	   human	   capital	   formation	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	  long-­‐run.	  	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   credit	   market	   imperfections,	   non-­‐financial	   hurdles	   can	   impede	   the	  accumulation	  of	  human	  capital.	  Galor	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  proposed	  a	   theory	   in	  which	   inequality	   in	  landownership	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  economic	  growth.	  They	  show	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  education	   expenditure	   across	   states	   in	   the	   U.S.	   stem	   from	   variation	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	  landownership.	   Similarly	   to	   Galor	   and	   Zeira	   (1993),	   this	   theory	   explores	   of	   the	   favorable	  conditions	  for	  human	  capital	  accumulation,	  but	  it	  differs	  in	  that	  the	  hurdle	  for	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  is	  not	  a	  financial	  barrier	  but	  rather	  inequality	  in	  landownership.	  	  Cinnirella	   and	   Hornung	   (2011)	   find	   supporting	   evidence	   for	   the	   adverse	   effect	   of	  inequality	   in	   landownership	   on	   the	   timing	   of	   human	   capital	   formation	   using	   data	   from	  nineteenth	  century	  Prussia.	  They	  argued	  that	  landowners	  delayed	  the	  establishment	  of	  mass	  education	  through	  the	  institution	  of	  serfdom	  that	  restricted	  labor	  mobility	  and	  therefore	  the	  benefit	   from	   human	   capital	   accumulation.	   Despite	   the	   presence	   of	   schools	   and	   teachers,	  regions	  with	  higher	  land	  concentration	  had	  lower	  education	  attainment.	   	   	  After	  the	  abolition	  of	   serfdom	   and	   the	   emancipation	   of	   the	   peasantry,	   the	   rise	   in	   education	   enhanced	   the	  development	  in	  Prussia	  and	  permitted	  its	  transition	  to	  a	  higher	  growth	  path.	  	  
3	  The	  Model	  	  In	   their	   seminal	   work,	   Galor	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   and	   Galor	   (2011)	   stressed	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   human	   capital	   in	   the	   growth	   process,	   and	   underlined	   the	   non-­‐monotonic	  relationship	   between	   inequality	   and	   growth.	   Using	   their	   framework,	   I	   can	   derive	   a	   simple	  model	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Galor	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  	  Consider	   an	   overlapping	   generations	   model	   in	   which	   each	   individual	   lives	   two	  periods	   and	  has	   one	  parent	   and	  one	   child.	   In	   this	  model,	   there	   are	   two	  production	   sectors,	  agriculture	   and	  manufacturing,	   which	   produce	   the	   same	   homogenous	   good	   that	   is	   used	   in	  consumption	  and	  investment.	  That	  is,	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  where	   is	  the	  aggregate	  output	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  and	   	  is	  the	  aggregate	  output	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector.	  	  Both	   sectors	   have	   a	   neo-­‐classical,	   constant-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐scale,	   strictly	   increasing,	   and	  concave	  production	  function.	  Specifically,	  the	  production	  function	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  is	  a	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  production	  function.	  Thus,	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  ,	  	  	  	   ,	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
yt = ytA + ytM
ytA ytM
ytA = F(Xt ,Lt )
ytM = KtαHt1−α = Htktα kt = Kt /Ht α ∈(0,1)
where	   is	  land,	   is	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  employed	  by	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  in	  period	  t,	  	  is	   the	  quantity	  of	  physical	  capital,	  and	   	  is	  the	  quantity	  of	  human	  capital	  (measured	  in	  efficiency	  units)	   employed	   in	   production	   in	   period	   t.	   Physical	   capital	   fully	   depreciates	   after	  one	  period.	  	  The	   inputs	   are	   different	   in	   each	   production	   function.	   In	   the	   agricultural	   sector,	   the	  inputs	  are	  land,	  which	  is	  fixed	  over	  time,	  and	  labor,	  whereas	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  the	  inputs	  are	  capital,	  which	  is	  accumulated	  over	  time,	  and	  labor.	  Furthermore,	  human	  capital	  is	  independent	  of	  labor	  productivity	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  whereas	  in	  the	  industrial	  sector,	  human	  capital	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  labor	  productivity.	  Because	  the	  markets	  in	  both	  sectors	  are	  perfectly	  competitive,	  the	  result	  of	  profit	  maximization	  is	  as	  follows.	  ,	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4)	  ,	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (5)	  where	   is	   the	  wage	   rate	   per	  worker	   in	   the	   agricultural	   sector,	   is	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   to	  land,	   is	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  to	  capital,	  and	   is	  the	  wage	  rate	  per	  efficiency	  unit	  of	  labor.	  	  Recall	   that	   individuals	   in	  this	  model	   live	  two	  periods	  and	  have	  one	  parent	  and	  child.	  Each	  individual	  has	  the	  same	  preferences,	  so	  individuals	  only	  differ	  in	  their	  initial	  wealth.	  The	  utility	  function	  of	  individual	  i	  in	  period	  t	  is	  a	  log-­‐linear	  utility	  function	  as	  follows.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (6)	  where	   	  is	   second-­‐period	   consumption,	   is	   a	   transfer	   to	   an	   individual’s	   offspring,	   and	  .	   In	   the	   first	  period	  of	  an	   individual’s	   life,	  he	  spends	  his	   time	  accumulating	  human	  capital.	   A	   fraction,	   ,	   of	   his	   capital	   transfers	   from	   his	   parent,	   ,	   is	   collected	   by	   the	  government	  for	  the	  public	  education	  system,	  and	  a	  fraction,	   ,	  of	  these	  capital	  transfers	  is	  saved	  for	  future	  income.	  In	  the	  second	  period,	  he	  earns	  income,	  which	  includes	  wages,	   ,	  returns	  on	  capital,	   ,	  and	  returns	  on	  land,	   ,	  and	  he	  allocates	  this	  income	  to	  consumption	   and	   bequests	   to	   his	   child.	   The	   entire	   stock	   of	   land	   that	   he	   receives	   from	   his	  parent	  is	  transferred	  to	  his	  child.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  period	  income,	   ,	  of	  individual	  i	  is	  as	  follows.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (7)	  The	   optimal	   transfer	   of	   individual	   i	   born	   in	   period	   t	   is	   ,	   and	   the	   optimal	  consumption	  of	  individual	  i	  born	  in	  period	  t	  is	   .	  	  I	   assume	   there	   are	   only	   three	   homogenous	   groups	   of	   individuals	   in	   period	   0,	  landowners,	  capitalists,	  and	  workers,	  who	  have	  the	  same	  preferences	  but	  have	  different	  initial	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levels	   of	   wealth	   and	   landownership.	   Landowners	   own	   the	   entire	   stock	   of	   land	   	  in	   the	  economy,	   and	   the	   fraction	   of	   all	   individuals	   who	   are	   landowners	   is	   given	   by	   .	  Because	   all	   land	   holdings	   are	   transferred	   from	   parents	   to	   children,	   the	   distribution	   of	  landownership	   is	   constant	   over	   time,	   and	   each	   landlord	   possesses	   	  units	   of	   land.	  Capitalists	   possess	   the	   entire	   initial	   stock	   of	   physical	   capital,	   and	   their	   fraction	   in	   the	  population	   is	   given	   by	   .	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   individuals,	   whose	   fraction	   is	   given	   by	  ,	   are	   workers	   who	   own	   neither	   land	   nor	   physical	   capital.	   Because	   every	  individual	  has	  one	  parent	  and	  one	  child,	  the	  fraction	  of	  each	  type	  of	  worker	  does	  not	  change	  over	   time.	   As	   this	   economy	   develops,	   however,	   every	   individual	   can	   accumulate	   physical	  capital.	  	  I	   further	   assume	   that	   landowners	   are	   the	   pivotal	   force	   in	   determining	   the	  implementation	  of	  public	  education	  policy.	  This	  assumption	  is	  not	  strong	  considering	  modern	  history.	   Then,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   landowner’s	   income	  evolution.	   The	   second	  period	   income	  of	   a	  landowner	  is	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (8)	  and	  his	  transfer	  to	  his	  child	  is	  	   (9)	  As	  Galor	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  showed,	  theoretically,	  there	  exists	  a	  critical	  level	  of	  total	  capital	  transfers	   to	   all	   landowners,	   ,	   such	   that	   the	   implementation	   of	   public	   education	  becomes	   more	   profitable	   for	   landowners	   despite	   the	   cost	   of	   tax.	   In	   other	   words,	   as	   the	  economy	   develops,	   the	   share	   of	   land	   in	   aggregate	   output	   decreases,	   and	   the	   stakes	   of	  landowners	   in	   other	   sectors	   increase.	   Because	   of	   these	   changes	   in	   landowners’	   economic	  interests,	  their	  opposition	  to	  public	  education	  decreases	  until	  eventually,	  they	  support	  public	  education	   instead.	  Therefore,	  an	  economy	   that	  has	  a	  powerful	   landed	  elite,	  which	   is	  akin	   to	  having	  higher	  inequality	   in	   landownership,	  tends	  to	  accumulate	  human	  capital	  slowly.	  Thus,	  inequality	  in	  landownership	  can	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  human	  capital	  accumulation.	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economic	   development	   of	   their	   own	   countries.	   Korea’s	   development	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	  century,	   however,	   occurred	   in	   a	   different	   context	   from	   these	   countries	   because	   Korea	  was	  under	   Japanese	   occupancy	   from	   1905	   to	   1945,	   and	   its	   economy	   was	   determined	   by	   the	  Japanese	  economy.	  	  Under	  Japanese	  rule,	  land	  distribution	  became	  skewed,	  and	  the	  ratio	  of	  tenants	  to	  all	  farming	  households	  grew	  from	  42	  percent	  in	  1913	  to	  70	  percent	  in	  1945	  (Eckert	  et	  al.	  1991).	  The	   following	  policy	  of	   Japan	  and	   the	  Government-­‐General,	   the	  chief	  colonial	  administrator,	  promoted	   this	   change.	   From	   the	   beginning	   of	   colonial	   period,	   the	   Japanese	   government	  encouraged	  migration	  from	  Japan	  to	  Korea	  and	  suggested	  that	  becoming	  a	   landlord	  was	  the	  ideal	   pattern	   of	   Japanese	   settlement	   in	   Korea	   (Kikkawa,	   1904).	   In	   1907,	   the	   Oriental	  Development	   Company,	   a	   semi-­‐governmental	   Japanese	   company,	   began	   to	   purchase	   large	  amounts	   of	   land	   to	   entice	   Japanese	   settlers	   to	   Korea	   and	   eventually	   became	   the	   biggest	  landlord	  in	  Korea	  (Moskowitz	  1974;	  Eckert	  et	  al.	  1991).	  In	  1912,	  the	  Japanese	  Land	  Survey	  on	  Korean	   Land	   also	   encouraged	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   tenancy	   rate	   because	   it	   strengthened	   the	  legal	   rights	   of	   landowners	   and	   increased	   Japanese	   investment	   in	   land.	   The	   interaction	  between	  strong	   landowners’	   rights,	  market	   forces,	  and	   increased	  population	   led	   to	  a	  higher	  tenant	  ratio	  (Kim	  et	  al.	  1989;	  Shin	  1982;	  Eckert	  et	  al.	  1991).	  	  Japanese	   rule	   also	   played	   a	   major	   factor	   in	   Korean	   industrialization.	   The	  Government-­‐General	  intended	  to	  mold	  the	  Korean	  economy	  to	  fit	  Japan’s	  needs	  by	  prohibiting	  the	  development	  of	  Korean	  industries	  and	  companies,	  promoting	  an	  agricultural	  economy	  in	  Korea,	  and	  selling	   Japanese	   industrial	  goods	   in	   the	  Korean	  market.	  However,	  because	   Japan	  was	  substantially	  industrialized	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  because	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  is	  located	  between	  Japan	  and	  China,	  Japan	  began	  to	  promote	  some	  industry	  in	  Korea	  so	  as	  to	  establish	   a	   supply	   base	   to	   invade	   China,	   especially	   after	   the	   Japanese	   occupation	   of	  Manchuria.	   Korean	   industrialists,	   who	   were	   educated	   in	   the	   language	   and	   skills	   of	  entrepreneurs,	  did	  begin	   to	   appear	  after	  1919.	  Nevertheless,	   Japanese	   colonial	  policy	   is	   the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  understanding	  Korean	  industrialization	  under	  Japanese	  rule	  (Eckert	  et	  al.	  1991).	  	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  public	  education	  system	  in	  Korea	  under	  Japanese	  rule	  also	  differed	   from	   that	   of	   the	   U.S.	   or	   Prussia	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   The	   purpose	   of	   public	  education	   under	   Japanese	   occupancy	   was	   to	   condition	   Koreans	   to	   be	   good	   citizens	   of	   the	  Japanese	   Empire,	   by	   teaching	   them	   Japanese	   culture	   and	   language.	   The	   public	   education	  system	   operated	   by	   the	   Government-­‐General	   did	   coexist	   with	   Korean	   private	   schools,	   but	  these	  schools	  were	  oppressed.	  Moreover,	  the	  public	  education	  system	  was	  an	  unequal	  system	  differentiated	   by	   the	   quality	   of	   instruction.	   Korean	   students	   received	   a	   minimal	   level	   of	  schooling,	   whereas	   Japanese	   students	   received	   a	   more	   advanced	   education.	   The	   historical	  
context	  is,	  therefore,	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  the	  Korean	  public	  education	  system	  as	  well	  (Eckert	  et	  al.	  1991;	  Kim	  1999).	  Despite	   the	   distinctive	   Korean	   colonial	   experience,	   however,	   the	   relationship	  between	  inequality	  in	  landownership	  and	  the	  public	  education	  system	  can	  be	  generalized	  in	  my	  model.	   Every	   local	   area	   reacted	  differently	   to	   the	   public	   education	  policy	   of	   the	   central	  government	  because	  of	  differences	  in	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  industrialization,	  urbanization,	   culture,	   geographical	   character,	   and	   inequality	   in	   landownership.	   Moreover,	  landowners	   were	   superior	   to	   tenants,	   controlled	   their	   tenants’	   farming,	   and	   could	   affect	  tenants’	  individual	  lives	  through	  their	  ruling	  power,	  as	  in	  serfdom	  in	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  Prussia	  (Soh	  2005).	  Therefore,	   the	   level	  of	  elementary	  education	  could	  vary	  with	  respect	   to	  the	  degree	  of	  inequality	  in	  land	  distribution.	  Accordingly,	  this	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  variations	  in	  the	  reactions	  to	  educational	  policy	  across	  different	  regions.	  Although	   this	   paper	   only	   examines	   the	   period	   before	   independence	   in	   1945,	   the	  Korean	  historical	  context	  could	  allow	  a	  further	  investigation	  into	  the	  effect	  of	  land	  reform	  on	  education	   policy	   only	   after	   independence	   in	   1945.	   After	   independence,	   Korea	   was	   divided	  into	  South	  Korea	  and	  North	  Korea,	   and	   land	  reform	  was	   included	   in	   the	  Constitution	  of	   the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  (South	  Korea)	  in	  1948.	  The	  Agricultural	  Land	  Reform	  Amendment	  Act	  was	  implemented	   in	   1950,	   just	   before	   the	   Korean	   War.	   The	   Act	   stated	   that	   only	   farmers	   who	  cultivated	  the	  land	  could	  possess	  it	  and	  that	  each	  farmer	  could	  have	  at	  most	  three	  jung-­‐bo,	  or	  around	   30,000	  m2,	   of	   land.	   Furthermore,	   tenancy	   was	   prohibited.	   Land	   reform	   reallocated	  land,	   and	   the	   ratio	  of	   tenants	   to	   landowners	  officially	  became	  zero	   in	  1950.	  The	  number	  of	  agricultural	   households	   that	   owned	   their	   own	   land	   jumped	   from	   349,000	   in	   1949	   to	  1,812,000	  in	  1950	  (Jeon	  and	  Kim	  2000).	  	  Soaring	  expenditures	  on	  education	  accompanied	  land	  reform.	  South	  Korea	  regarded	  literacy	  as	  vital	  for	  establishing	  democracy,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  campaign	  to	  increase	  the	  literacy	  rate.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  illiteracy	  rate	  dropped	  from	  78	  percent	  in	  1945	  to	  42	  percent	  in	  1948.	  In	  1949,	  a	  new	  education	  law	  was	  passed	  in	  South	  Korea	  that	  aimed	  to	  supply	  public	  education	  to	  everyone	  and	  build	  a	  skilled	  workforce	  for	  industrial	  work.	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  law	  was	  postponed	  until	  1954,	  however,	  with	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  1950.	  Thereafter,	  its	  implementation	  allowed	  the	  elementary	  school	  enrollment	  rate	  to	  grow	  from	  54	  percent	  to	  96	  percent	   in	   1959.	   Koreans	   also	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   nation’s	   technical	   power	  through	  their	  experience	  with	  Japanese	  rule,	  and	  thus	  tried	  to	  build	  an	  education	  system	  with	  an	   emphasis	   on	   technical	   training	   and	   science.	   To	   do	   so,	   they	   founded	   a	   bureau	   under	   the	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  president	  that	  managed	  education	  in	  science	  and	  technical	  training	  and	  established	  a	  five-­‐year	  plan	  for	  practical	  training	  to	  fortify	  industrial	  human	  capital	  (Ministry	  
of	   Education	   1988).	   As	   a	   result,	   Korea	   industrialized	   quickly	   and	   is	   now	   a	   member	   of	   the	  OECD.	  	   Despite	  Korea’s	  unique	  colonial	  experience,	  its	  history	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  gives	  us	  a	  good	  opportunity	   to	  explore	   the	  relationship	  between	   inequality	   in	   landownership	  and	  education.	   First,	   given	   that	   under	   Japanese	   occupancy,	   tenancy	   prevailed	   and	   reactions	   to	  public	  education	  policy	  varied	  widely,	  I	  can	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  Second,	  after	   independence	   in	   1945	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   land	   reform	   in	   1950,	   the	   soaring	  enrollment	  rate	  in	  elementary	  schools	  supplied	  accumulated	  human	  capital	  to	  power	  Korean	  industrialization.	   Therefore,	   I	   can	   also	   analyze	   the	   different	   reactions	   to	   public	   education	  policy	  for	  the	  period	  from	  independence	  in	  1945	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  education	  law	  in	   1954,	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   local	   tradition	   of	   landownership,	   even	   though	   tenancy	   was	  officially	   abolished	   after	   land	   reform	   in	   1950.	   In	   this	   paper,	   however,	   I	   focus	   only	   on	   the	  period	   of	   Japanese	   occupancy	   and	   leave	   the	   period	   after	   independence	   to	   future	   studies.	  Given	  the	  controlling	  colonial	  factors,	  I	  can	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  land	  inequality	  and	  education.	  	  	  
	  
5	  Empirical	  Analysis	  
	  5.1	  Data	  description	  	   The	   data	   in	   this	   paper	   are	   sourced	   from	   the	   Annual	   Statistical	   Report	   of	   the	  
Government-­‐General.	   The	   Government-­‐General,	   which	   formed	   the	   Japanese	   colonial	  government	  in	  Korea	  from	  1910	  to	  1945,	  published	  the	  Report	  annually	  during	  their	  rule	  of	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  until	  1943.	  As	  the	  name	  suggests,	  the	  Report	  was	  a	  compilation	  of	  the	  most	   important	   statistical	   information.	   These	   data	   were	   first	   collected	   in	   1907	   by	   the	  Residency-­‐General	   (i.e.,	   the	   data	   supplied	   information	   from	   1906).	   The	   investigated	   items	  changed	  over	  the	  Japanese	  ruling	  period,	  but	  they	  remained	  consistent	   for	  the	  time	  period	  I	  consider	   in	   this	  paper	  (i.e.,	  1934	  to	  1942).	  My	  data	   include	   items	  such	  as	   land	  and	  weather,	  population	  and	  households,	  agriculture,	  manufacturing,	  fishery,	  forestry,	  money	  and	  banking,	  education,	  religion,	  finance,	  etc.	  (Park	  and	  Seo	  2003).	  	  5.2	  Empirical	  specification	  and	  results	  	   The	  empirical	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  equality	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	   landownership	   on	   the	   level	   of	   education.	   Equality	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   landownership,	  
,	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  number	  of	  farmers	  who	  cultivated	  their	  own	  land	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  farmers	  in	  province	  i	  in	  period	  t	  −	  1.	  The	  reason	  that	  I	  use	  equality	  rather	  than	  inequality	  is	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  inequality	  in	  landownership	  because	  there	  was	  variation	  in	  tenancy.	  For	  example,	  some	  farmers	  cultivated	  leased	  land	  and	  their	   own	   land	   simultaneously.	   The	   level	   of	   education,	   ,	   is	   measured	   as	   the	  number	  of	  public	  elementary	  school	   students	  per	  person	   in	  province	   i	  in	  period	   t.	  The	  data	  cover	   eight	   periods	   of	   observation	   from	   1934	   to	   1942	   and	   13	   provinces.	   A	   period	   of	  observation	  is	  one	  year,	  so	  that	  when	  t	  is	  1935,	  t	  −	  1	  is	  1934,	  and	  so	  on	  through	  1942.	  	  I	  use	  the	  following	  empirical	  specification.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (10)	  	   where	   	  is	  the	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  including	  the	  share	  of	  farmers	  in	  province	  
i	   in	   period	   t	   −	   1;	   the	   share	   of	   jobs	   requiring	   more	   human	   capital,	   which	   is	   the	   share	   of	  workers,	   such	   as	   merchants	   and	   public	   officials,	   in	   high	   human	   capital	   occupations	   in	  province	  i	  in	  period	  t	  −	  1;	  the	  rate	  of	  population	  growth	  in	  province	  i	  in	  period	  t	  −	  1;	  the	  share	  of	   Japanese	   individuals	   in	   province	   i	   in	   period	   t	  −	  1;	   and	   the	   number	   of	   public	   elementary	  schools	   per	   1,000	  people	   in	   province	   i	   in	   period	   t	  −	  1.	  This	   formulation	   captures	   the	   lag	   in	  making	  changes	  to	  education	  with	  respect	  to	  current	  economic	  and	  political	  conditions.	  Table	  1	  provides	  summary	  statistics	  of	  variables.	  	  	  	   (insert	  Table	  1	  here)	  	   This	  paper	  uses	  panel	   data.	  A	  primary	  benefit	   of	   panel	   data	   is	   that	   it	   can	   solve	   the	  problem	  of	  unobserved	  heterogeneity,	  whereas	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   control	   in	   cross-­‐sectional	  or	  time	   series	   data.	   The	   error	   term	   	  can	   be	   divided	   into	   time	   invariant	   unobserved	  heterogeneity	  across	  provinces	  in	  the	  level	  of	  education, ,	  and	  variations	  in	  the	  time	  effect	  at	  the	  national	  level,	   .	  That	  is,	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (11)	  	  	  Because	  data	   in	  this	  paper	  are	  not	  a	  sample	  of	   the	  population	  but	  rather	  reflect	   the	  entire	  population,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  of	   	  as	  a	  parameter	  to	  be	  estimated	  instead	  of	  a	  random	  variable.	  My	  model,	  then,	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  fixed	  effects	  model.	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   (insert	  Figure	  1	  here)	  	  	   The	  positive	  correlation	  between	  land	  equality	  and	  education	  is	  apparent	  in	  Figure	  1.	  The	  points	  in	  the	  circle	  represent	  data	  from	  the	  GyeongGi	  province,	  which	  includes	  Seoul,	  the	  capital	   city	   of	   Korea.	   It	   had	   both	   the	   smallest	   share	   of	   farmers	   and	   the	   highest	   level	   of	  urbanization,	  which	  are	  two	  variables	  to	  be	  controlled	  for.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (insert	  Figure	  2	  here)	  	   In	   Figure	   2,	   I	   remove	   data	   pertaining	   to	   the	  GyeongGi	   province,	   and	   I	   find	   stronger	  evidence	  of	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  land	  equality	  and	  education.	  	  
	   	  	   (insert	  Table	  2	  here)	  
	   Table	  2	  depicts	  the	  results	  of	  this	  estimation	  in	  columns	  (1)–(6).	  Lagged	  land	  equality	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  highly	  significant	  effect	  on	  education	  with	  no	  controls	  (column	  (1))	  as	  well	  as	  when	   controlling	   for	   the	   share	   of	   agriculture,	   the	   share	   of	   jobs	   requiring	   a	   high	   level	   of	  human	   capital,	   the	   rate	   of	   population	   growth,	   the	   share	   of	   Japanese	   individuals,	   and	   the	  number	   of	   public	   elementary	   schools	   per	   1,000	   people.	   As	   one	   would	   expect,	   column	   (2)	  shows	  that	  the	  share	  of	  agriculture	  has	  a	  negative	  and	  highly	  significant	  effect	  on	  education,	  and	  we	   continue	   to	   observe	   a	   positive	   and	   significant	   effect	   of	   land	   equality	   on	   education.	  Similarly,	  as	  the	  theory	  predicts,	  the	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital	  has	  a	  positive	  and	   highly	   significant	   effect	   on	   education.	   Because	   of	   collinearity	   between	   the	   share	   of	  agricultural	  jobs	  and	  the	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital,	  I	  include	  only	  the	  latter	  in	   the	   regressions	   in	   columns	   (4)–(6).	   The	   coefficient	   on	   the	   share	   of	   jobs	   requiring	   a	   high	  level	   of	   human	   capital	   is	   positive	   and	   significant.	   In	   columns	   (4)–(6),	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  population	  growth	  rate	  on	  education	  is	  negative	  and	  highly	  significant,	  reflecting	  the	  quantity-­‐quality	  trade-­‐off	  in	  education	  in	  this	  period.	  The	  share	  of	  Japanese	  individuals	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  highly	   significant	  effect,	   reflecting	   the	   fact	   that	   Japanese	   individuals	   in	  Korea	   tended	   to	  receive	  more	   education.	   Even	   controlling	   for	   the	   share	  of	   Japanese	   individuals,	   the	  positive	  and	   strong	   effect	   of	   land	   equality	   on	   the	   education	   holds.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   significant	  relationship	   between	   land	   equality	   and	   education	  may	   not	   have	   held	  when	   colonial	   factors	  were	  controlled	  for,	   if	  the	  colonial	  government	  had	  made	  a	  decision	  on	  land	  equality	  and	  on	  education	   simultaneously.	   However,	   the	   levels	   of	   land	   equality	   and	   education	   were	   not	  decided	  upon	  by	  the	  colonial	  government	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  tenancy	  did	  increase	  
with	   the	   colonial	   government’s	   encouragement	   towards	   land	   inequality	   during	   the	   colonial	  regime.	  However,	  according	  to	  Soh	  (2005),	  before	  the	  1930s,	  the	  tenancy	  rate	  had	  stabilized	  and	  land	  equality	  during	  the	  period	  being	  considered	  in	  this	  study	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  level	  of	  agricultural	   output	   of	   each	   year.	   Also,	   because	   landowners	   were	   superior	   to	   tenants	   and	  controlled	   the	   tenants’	   production	   processes	   and	   economic	   conditions,	   the	   decision	   of	   the	  tenant’s	   household	   pertaining	   to	   their	   children’s	   education	   could	   not	   result	   only	   from	   the	  education	  policy	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  In	  column	  (6),	  I	  control	  for	  the	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  1,000	  people	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  schools	  on	  education.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  the	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  1,000	  people	  is	  not	  significant,	  and	  including	  this	  control	  does	  not	  change	  my	  coefficient	  of	  interest.	  	  	  	   (insert	  Table	  3	  here)	  	  	   (insert	  Table	  4	  here)	  	  	  	   Tables	  3	  and	  4	  present	  robustness	  checks.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  effect	  of	  land	  equality	  on	  education	  is	  positive	  and	  highly	  significant.	  The	  main	  findings	  in	  Table	  2	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  Table	  3	  (lagging	  land	  equality	  by	  two	  years)	  and	  Table	  4	  (no	  lag	  at	  all),	  and	  are	  thus	  robust.	  	  I	   tried	   to	  perform	  an	   instrumental	  variables	   (IVs)	  estimation,	   as	  done	   in	  Galor	  et	   al.	  (2009)	   and	   Cinnirella	   and	   Hornung	   (2011).	   These	   papers	   used	   the	   following	   instrumental	  variables:	   the	   relative	   price	   of	   agricultural	   goods,	   which	   reflects	   the	   differential	   effect	   of	  agricultural	  prices	  over	   time	  on	  the	  concentration	  of	   landownership	  across	  regions,	  and	  the	  climatic	  conditions	  of	  each	  region,	  which	  are	  region-­‐specific	  but	  time	  invariant.	  However,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Pacific	  War	  in	  1939	  led	  the	  Japanese	  colonial	  government	  to	  control	  both	  the	  price	  and	  the	  distribution	  system	  of	  food.	  We,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  have	  the	  relevant	  data	  to	  use	  this	   identification	   strategy.	   Nevertheless,	   endogeneity	   is	   sufficiently	   controlled	   in	   the	   fixed	  effects	  model	  with	  panel	  data.	  	  	  
	  
6	  Conclusion	  	   Human	   capital	   accumulation	   plays	   a	   critical	   role	   both	   in	   the	   transition	   from	  Malthusian	   stagnation	   to	   modern	   growth	   and	   in	   the	   timing	   of	   modern	   growth’s	  implementation.	  Institutions	  promoting	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  
great	  divergence	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  across	  countries.	  Credit	  market	  imperfections	  provide	  one	  well-­‐studied	  hurdle	  for	  the	  accumulation	  of	  human	  capital,	  but	  non-­‐financial	  hurdles	  are	  also	  important	  impediment	  for	  human	  capital	  accumulation.	  	  The	  historical	   empirical	   evidence	  of	   the	   effects	   of	   these	  non-­‐financial	   hurdles	   in	   the	  current	  economic	  literature,	  however,	  is	  limited	  to	  Prussia	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  U.S.	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century.	   These	   two	   countries	   industrialized	   on	   their	   own	  development	  paths	  spontaneously.	  Korea	  under	   Japanese	  occupancy,	  by	  contrast,	  developed	  in	   a	   different	   context	   from	   these	   two	   countries	   because	   of	   its	   colonial	   experience.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  adverse	  effect	  of	  inequality	  in	  landownership	  on	  the	  accumulation	  of	  human	  capital	  holds,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  model	  formalized	  by	  Galor	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  more	  general	  cases.	  	  I	  used	  a	  panel	  dataset	  with	  observations	   from	  13	  regions	   in	  each	  year	   from	  1934	  to	  1942.	  With	   panel	   data,	   I	   controlled	   for	   unobserved	   variables	   using	   a	   two-­‐way	   fixed	   effects	  model	   and	   solved	   the	   endogeneity	   problem.	   Although	   land	   distribution	   and	   the	   public	  education	  system	  in	  Korea	  were	  driven	  in	  part	  by	  the	  colonial	  powers,	  reactions	  to	  the	  central	  education	   policy	   varied	   by	   region	   because	   of	   differences	   in	   the	   level	   of	   inequality	   of	  landownership.	  My	  results	  showed	  that	  landownership	  inequality,	  a	  non-­‐financial	  hurdle,	  had	  a	  strongly	  significant	  effect	  on	  human	  capital	  accumulation.	  	  Finally,	  these	  results	  could	  be	  strengthened	  by	  further	  research	  analyzing	  the	  effect	  of	  inequality	  in	  landownership	  under	  Japanese	  occupancy	  on	  growth	  in	  education	  after	  the	  land	  reform	  and	  education	  reform	  laws	  in	  1950	  were	  enacted.	  This	  analysis	  would	  determine	  the	  long-­‐run	  effects	   of	  non-­‐financial	   hurdles	  on	  human	   capital	   accumulation,	   one	  of	   the	  driving	  forces	  of	  Korean	  economic	  growth.	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Fig.	   1	   Land	   equality	   and	   education	   in	   all	   regions.	   The	   points	   in	   the	   circle	   represent	   data	   from	   the	  GyeongGi	  province,	  which	  includes	  Seoul,	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Korea.	  	  



































Fig.	  2	  Land	  equality	  and	  education	  excluding	  the	  GyeongGi	  province.	  	  
Source:	  the	  Annual	  Statistical	  Report	  of	  the	  Government-­‐General	  	  	  













Table	  1	  Summary	  statistics	  
	  	   Mean	   Std.dev.	   Min	   Max	  number	  of	  elementary	  school	  students	  per	  person	  	   0.0038	   0.0023	   0.0011	   0.0094	  land	  equality	  	   0.1989	   0.1248	   0.0450	   0.5455	  share	  of	  agriculture	  	   0.7283	   0.1161	   0.3612	   0.8750	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital	  	   0.1542	   0.0699	   0.0774	   0.3823	  population	  growth	  rate	   0.0276	   0.0273	   -­‐0.0194	   0.1389	  share	  of	  Japanese	  	   0.0271	   0.0175	   0.0087	   0.0666	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  population	  	   0.0118	   0.0056	   0.0033	   0.0262	  Land	  inequality	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  number	  of	  farmers	  who	  cultivated	  their	  own	  land	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	   farmers.	   Share	  of	   agriculture	   is	   the	   share	  of	   farmers	   and	   the	   share	  of	   jobs	   requiring	  more	  human	  capital	   is	   the	   share	  of	  workers	   such	   as	  merchants	   and	  public	   officials,	  which	   are	  high	  human	   capital	  occupations.	   The	   number	   of	   schools	   per	   population	   is	   the	   number	   of	   public	   elementary	   schools	   per	  1,000	  people.	  	  
Source:	  the	  Annual	  Statistical	  Report	  of	  the	  Government-­‐General	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
Table	  2	  The	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  land	  equality	  (Fixed	  effects	  model	  with	  1-­‐year	  lag)	  	  	  
Explanatory	  variables	   Dependent	  variable:	  number	  of	  elementary	  school	  students	  per	  person	  	  (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
land	  equality	  	   0.0189***	   0.0231***	   0.0235***	   0.0235***	   0.0248***	   0.0245***	  0.0051	   0.0048	   0.0046	   0.0045	   0.0044	   0.0045	  
share	  of	  agriculture	  	   	   -­‐0.0031***	   	   	   	   	  	   0.0007	   	   	   	   	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital	  	   	   	   0.0068***	   0.0089***	   0.0043*	   0.0045*	  	   	   0.0014	   0.0017	   0.0022	   0.0023	  population	  growth	  rate	   	   	   	   -­‐0.0030**	   -­‐0.0039***	   -­‐0.0039***	  	   	   	   0.0014	   0.0013	   0.0014	  share	  of	  Japanese	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0465***	   0.0453***	  	   	   	   	   0.0158	   0.0167	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  population	  	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0065	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0251	  National	  time	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  Regional	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  R2	  (within)	   0.3285	   0.4484	   0.4761	   0.5053	   0.5533	   0.5537	  Observation	   104	   104	   104	   104	   104	   104	  













Table	  3	  The	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  land	  equality	  (Fixed	  effects	  model	  with	  2-­‐year	  lag)	  	  	  
Explanatory	  variables	   Dependent	  variable:	  number	  of	  elementary	  school	  students	  per	  person	  	  (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
land	  equality	  	   0.0148**	   0.0195***	   0.0208***	   0.0208***	   0.0209***	   0.0213***	  0.0059	   0.0059	   0.0059	   0.0059	   0.0059	   0.0062	  
share	  of	  agriculture	  	   	   -­‐0.0029***	   	   	   	   	  	   0.0010	   	   	   	   	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital	  	   	   	   0.0059***	   0.0062**	   0.0037	   0.0036	  	   	   0.0019	   0.0024	   0.0034	   0.0035	  population	  growth	  rate	   	   	   	   -­‐0.0002	   -­‐0.0007	   -­‐0.0008	  	   	   	   0.0016	   0.0017	   0.0018	  share	  of	  Japanese	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0221	   0.0238	  	   	   	   	   0.0214	   0.0231	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  population	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.0069	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0335	  National	  time	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  Regional	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  R2	  (within)	   0.2707	   0.3446	   0.3597	   0.3599	   0.3698	   0.3702	  Observation	   91	   91	   91	   91	   91	   91	  


















Table	  4	  The	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  land	  equality	  (Fixed	  effects	  model	  with	  no	  lag) 	  	  
Explanatory	  variables	   Dependent	  variable:	  number	  of	  elementary	  school	  students	  per	  person	  	  (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
land	  equality	  	   0.0060	   0.0118***	   0.0104**	   0.0111**	   0.0142***	   0.0108***	  0.0048	   0.0045	   0.0045	   0.0045	   0.0038	   0.0041	  
share	  of	  agriculture	  	   	   -­‐0.0037***	   	   	   	   	  	   0.0007	   	   	   	   	  share	  of	  jobs	  requiring	  more	  human	  capital	  	   	   	   0.0069***	   0.0083***	   -­‐0.0005	   0.0008	  	   	   0.0015	   0.0017	   0.0020	   0.0021	  population	  growth	  rate	   	   	   	   -­‐0.0026	   -­‐0.0040***	   -­‐0.0042***	  	   	   	   0.0014	   0.0012	   0.0012	  share	  of	  Japanese	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0911***	   0.0829***	  	   	   	   	   0.0149	   0.0153	  number	  of	  schools	  per	  population	  	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0413*	  	   	   	   	   	   0.0210	  National	  time	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  Regional	  fixed	  effect	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	   yes	  R2	  (within)	   0.2199	   0.3844	   0.3610	   0.3827	   0.5603	   0.5782	  Observation	   117	   117	   117	   117	   117	   117	  
Note:	  ***denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  1%	  level,	  **	  at	  5%,	  and	  *	  at	  10%.	  	  	  
